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In	2014,	 news	of	 a	water	 crisis	 in	Flint,	Michigan,	 shook	 the	nation.1	
Tests	 conducted	 after	 months	 of	 public	 complaints	 confirmed	
investigators’	worst	fears:	the	city’s	taps	contained	dangerously	high	levels	
of	 lead	 and	 had	 poisoned	 people	 for	 years.2	 A	 wave	 of	 studies	 soon	




appointed	 an	 emergency	 manager	 who	 reduced	 costs	 by	 pulling	 water	
from	a	nearby	river.5	The	river’s	corrosive	water	leached	lead	off	the	aging	
pipes	that	carried	it	across	the	city.6	Residents	quickly	notified	officials	of	a	
decrease	 in	 water	 cleanliness.7	 However,	 Michigan’s	 Department	 of	
Environmental	Quality	had	been	hollowed	by	years	of	austerity	and	failed	
to	respond.8	
Seasoned	observers	blamed	 the	disaster	on	 inadequate	 tax	 revenues.	












6.	 See	Ted	Roelofs,	 Signs	 of	 Trouble	 at	MDEQ,	 Years	Before	 Flint	 Lead	Crisis,	
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the	 making.”9	 He	 pointed	 to	 tax	 limits	 passed	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	 1990s,	
which	 constrained	 the	 state’s	 ability	 to	 fund	 infrastructure	 and	 health	
inspections.10	 The	 situation	 only	 worsened	 in	 the	 years	 preceding	 the	
water	 crisis.	 In	 2011,	 to	 offset	 a	 $1.6	 billion	business	 tax	 cut,	Michigan’s	
Governor	curtailed	the	tax	revenue	the	state	shared	with	municipalities—
money	that	cities	like	Flint	relied	on	to	stay	solvent.11	
Sadly,	 Flint’s	 story	 is	 emblematic	 of	 a	 much	 larger	 trend.	 American	
states	have	underinvested	in	infrastructure,	education,	and	public	welfare	
for	 decades.12	 While	 the	 growing	 costs	 of	 certain	 state	 programs	 have	




From	 the	 1930s	 to	 the	 1970s,	 states	 invested	 in	 public	 services	 that	
fostered	opportunity	for	each	of	their	residents.	States	partnered	with	the	
federal	 government	 to	 build	 the	 infrastructure	 that	 twentieth‐century	
businesses	 and	 their	 workers	 needed	 to	 thrive.	 States	 bolstered	
expenditures	on	high	schools	so	 that	a	majority	of	people	could	earn	 the	
credential	 for	 a	 well‐paying	 job.	 In	 anticipation	 of	 the	 technological	




Since	 the	 late	 1970s,	 however,	 states	 have	 taken	 a	 dramatic	 turn.	
Though	 their	populations	have	continued	 to	grow	at	an	 impressive	pace,	
states	 have	 tapered	 the	 investments	 needed	 to	 guarantee	 broad	 social	
mobility.	 Lawmakers	 have	 slowed	 infrastructure	 maintenance	 and	
eschewed	 new	 construction,	 leading	 America’s	 roadways,	 buildings,	 and	
water	 systems	 to	 fall	 into	 disrepair.	 State	 spending	 on	 primary	 and	












POL’Y	 1,	 7	 2015 ,	 http://www.milhs.org/wp‐content/uploads/2015/11/	
Enough‐is‐Enough‐BusinessTaxCuts.pdf	 https://perma.cc/42GR‐LVED .	
12.	 See	infra,	Section	I.B.	
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diminished	 access	 to	 higher	 education.	 Finally,	 states	 have	 struggled	 to	
adequately	fund	public	health	services.	
States’	 move	 from	 investment	 to	 retrenchment	 remains	 an	 enigma.	
Existing	 research	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 competing	 budget	
commitments	 have	 crowded	 one	 another	 out.	 For	 instance,	 researchers	
have	 shown	 that	 rising	 Medicaid	 costs	 have	 put	 pressure	 on	 funds	
available	 for	other	programs.	There	 is	also	growing	evidence	 that	prison	
outlays	 and	 high	 infrastructure	 prices	 have	 drawn	 money	 away	 from	
welfare	 projects.	 Yet	 the	 scale	 of	 states’	 spending	 shortfalls	 and	 their	
consistency	across	budget	areas	suggest	 that	other	 forces	have	also	been	
at	 work.	 These	 two	 elements	 imply	 that	 states	 have	 faced	 severe,	
structural	 budget	 deficits.	 As	 such,	 they	 point	 to	 a	 conspicuous	 culprit:	
insufficient	revenue.	
A	 close	 look	 at	 the	 data	 confirms	 that	 states	 have	 confronted	 two	
major	revenue	challenges	in	the	past	forty	years.	First,	unlike	polities	that	
have	 maintained	 healthy	 economies	 and	 robust	 investments	 in	 public	
services,	 American	 states	 have	 allowed	 their	 long‐run	 tax	 receipts	 to	
stagnate.	 Second,	 states’	 tax	 hauls	 have	 become	 more	 volatile	 in	 recent	
decades.	 Just	as	 they	do	with	 the	 spending	side	of	 the	equation,	 scholars	
must	 analyze	 the	 origins	 of	 these	 revenue	 problems.	 In	 particular,	 they	
must	probe	how	tax	laws	have	led	to	suboptimal	revenue	growth	and	why	
legislators	have	allowed	tax	systems	to	underperform.	
Prior	 work	 in	 economics	 and	 political	 science	 has	 provided	 a	
foundation	 for	 addressing	 these	questions.	With	 respect	 to	 the	 first,	 past	
studies	have	pointed	to	the	roles	of	four	legal	institutions:13	laws	actively	
limiting	 states’	 tax	 hauls;	withering	 sales	 tax	 regimes;	 eroding	 corporate	




It	 bears	 emphasizing	 that	 this	 Note	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 definitive	
account	 of	 states’	 tax	 histories	 over	 the	 past	 four	 decades.	 Indeed,	 no	
individual	study	could	do	so.	It	instead	seeks	to	bring	attention	to	an	area	
	





“shared	 prescriptions	 must,	 must	 not,	 or	 may 	 that	 are	 mutually	
understood	 and	 predictably	 enforced	 in	 particular	 situations	 by	 agents	
responsible	for	monitoring	conduct	and	imposing	sanctions.”	Elinor	Ostrom,	
Institutional	 Analysis	 and	 Development:	 Elements	 of	 the	 Framework	 in	
Historical	 Perspective,	 in	 HISTORICAL	 DEVELOPMENTS	 AND	 THEORETICAL	
APPROACHES	IN	SOCIOLOGY	263	 Charles	Crothers	ed.,	2010 .	
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of	 law	that	has	remained	underexplored	 for	 too	 long.	 It	also	aims	 to	arm	
researchers	 with	 the	 conceptual	 tools	 needed	 to	 uncover	 which	 tax	
institutions	have	decreased	state	revenue	and	why	tax	laws	have	evolved	
to	 promote	 this	 outcome—histories	 that	 undoubtedly	 vary	 richly	 across	
states,	policy	domains,	and	time	periods.	
To	elaborate	the	foregoing	arguments,	the	discussion	proceeds	in	four	
parts.	 Section	 I	 charts	 the	 shift	 in	 states’	 commitment	 to	 public	 services.	
Section	II	shows	that	 insufficient	tax	revenues	bear	some	of	the	blame.	 It	
further	notes	that	legal	scholars	have	yet	to	address	this	problem	despite	
the	 link	 between	 states’	 tax	 codes	 and	 the	 funds	 they	 raise.	 Section	 III	
draws	 on	 recent	 work	 in	 economics	 to	 unearth	 stagnant	 and	 unstable	
revenues’	 legal	 origins.	 Finally,	 Section	 IV	 invokes	 theories	 of	 policy	
change	to	hypothesize	these	laws’	political	determinants.	
I.	 AMERICA’S	STRUGGLING	STATES	
This	 section	 traces	 the	 rise	 and	 fall	 of	 states’	 investments	 in	 critical	
public	 services.	 American	 states	 are	 hidden	 engines	 of	 economic	
prosperity.	 They	 finance	 three‐quarters	 of	 the	 nation’s	 infrastructure.14	
Along	with	localities,	they	take	primary	responsibility	for	providing	public	
elementary,	 secondary,	 and	 tertiary	 education.15	 States	 also	 administer	 a	
host	of	health	and	welfare	programs.16	Nonetheless,	 they	 tend	 to	 receive	
less	scholarly	attention	than	the	federal	government.	
States	 became	more	 difficult	 to	 ignore	 after	 the	 Great	 Recession.	 By	
devastating	states’	budgets,	the	crash	spurred	public	service	cuts	so	deep	




14.	 See	 STATE	BUDGET	CRISIS	 TASK	 FORCE,	REPORT	 OF	THE	 STATE	BUDGET	CRISIS	 TASK	
FORCE	 6	 2012 ,	 https://www.theindustrycouncil.org/publications/State_	
Budget_Crisis_Task_Force_Full_Report.pdf	 https://perma.cc/NVX2‐FDJC .	
15.	 See	 Nicholas	 Johnson	 &	 Michael	 Leachman,	 Four	 Big	 Threats	 to	 State	
Finances	 Could	 Undermine	 Future	 U.S.	 Prosperity,	 CTR.	 ON	 BUDGET	 &	 POL’Y	
PRIORITIES	 2	 Feb.	 14,	 2013 ,	 https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/	
atoms/files/2‐14‐13sfp.pdf	 https://perma.cc/L4Q4‐PCSS .	
16.	 Id.	
17.	 See	 Tracy	 Gordon,	 State	 and	 Local	 Budgets	 and	 the	 Great	 Recession	
BROOKINGS	INSTITUTION	 Dec.	31	2012 ,	https://www.brookings.edu/articles/	
state‐and‐local‐budgets‐and‐the‐great‐recession/	 https://perma.cc/ZBB8	









the	 1970s,	 states	 worked	 with	 the	 federal	 government	 to	 make	
investments	 intended	 to	 foster	 social	mobility.	 Over	 the	 last	 forty	 years,	
however,	states	have	taken	a	radical	turn.	Though	their	populations	have	
continued	 to	 grow,	 states	 have	 stopped	 expanding	 institutions	 that	
promote	 broad	 opportunity.	 This	 choice	 has	 almost	 certainly	 helped	
accelerate	the	rise19	of	inequality	levels	unseen	since	the	1920s.20	Both	the	





Consolidation	 Int’l	 Mon.	 Fund,	 Working	 Paper	 13/151,	 June	 2013 ,	
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13151.pdf	 https://	
perma.cc/C28H‐W3JC .	 This	 is	 likely	 especially	 the	 case	 in	 U.S.	 states	
because	 the	 health,	 education,	 and	 infrastructure	 programs	 they	 have	
retrenched	 are	 particularly	 good	 at	 minimizing	 the	 effects	 of	 income	 and	
wealth	 disparities.	 The	 positive	 relationship	 between	 these	 services	 and	
improved	state‐level	outcomes	is	well‐documented	and	need	not	be	detailed	
here.	 For	 some	 of	 the	 most	 recent	 scholarship	 on	 the	 societal	 benefits	 of	
public	 infrastructure	 investment,	 see	 Emma	Hooper	 et	 al.,	 To	What	 Extent	






investing	 in	 public	 higher	 education,	 see	 Philip	 A.	 Trostel,	 High	 Returns:	
Public	 Investment	 in	 Higher	 Education,	 2008	 COMMUNITIES	 &	 BANKING	 31	
2008 	and	Michael	Hout,	Social	and	Economic	Returns	to	College	Education	
in	 the	 United	 States,	 38	 ANN.	 REV.	 SOCIOL.	 379	 2012 ;	 and	 for	 the	 social	








2018 ,	 https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/147963.pdf	 https://perma.cc/L7M‐	
59P4 .	
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	 A.		 The	Investment	Age	
In	 the	 mid‐twentieth	 century,	 state	 and	 local	 governments	 made	
substantial	commitments	to	their	residents.	The	U.S.	population	grew	from	
127	million	to	216	million	people	between	1935	and	1975—a	more	than	
70	 percent	 increase.21	 To	 accommodate	 the	 ever‐rising	 number	 of	
inhabitants	 and	 guarantee	 each	 the	 chance	 to	 prosper,	 states	 expanded	
their	social	policies	in	nearly	every	area	important	to	human	wellbeing.	
First,	together	with	federal	agencies,	states	poured	millions	of	dollars	
into	 the	 infrastructure	 that	 powered	 the	 mid‐twentieth‐century	
economy.22	Throughout	the	New	Deal,	states	served	as	crucial	partners	to	




and	 localities	 also	 directly	 sponsored	 most	 of	 these	 projects.25	 As	 the	
	
21.	 See	 POPULATION	 ESTIMATES	 PROGRAM,	 POPULATION	 DIVISION,	 U.S.	 CENSUS	 BUREAU,	
HISTORICAL	NATIONAL	POPULATION	ESTIMATES:	JULY	1,	1900	TO	JULY	1,	1999	 June	
28,	 2000 ,	 https://www2.census.gov/programs‐surveys/popest/tables/	
1900‐1980/national/totals/popclockest.txt	 https://perma.cc/3UEF‐XVSG .	
22.	 See	JAMES	A.	MAXWELL,	FEDERAL	GRANTS	AND	THE	BUSINESS	CYCLE	26	tbl.	9	 1952 ;	
John	Joseph	Wallis,	The	Birth	of	the	Old	Federalism:	Financing	the	New	Deal,	
1932–1940,	44	J.	ECON.	HIST.	139,	147	 1984 	 noting	that	nearly	“ a ll	of	the	







“built,	 improved	 or	 renovated	 39,370	 schools;	 2,550	 hospitals;	 1,074	
libraries;	2,700	firehouses;	.	.	.	 and 	1,050	airports	.	.	.	.	It	also	dug	more	than	
1,000	tunnels;	surfaced	639,000	miles	of	roads	and	installed	nearly	1	million	
miles	 of	 sidewalks,	 curbs	 and	 street	 lighting	.	.	.	.”	 Andrea	 Stone,	 When	




	 As	 one	 historian	 has	 observed,	 “a	 vast	 amount	 of	 states’ 	 physical	 and	
cultural	infrastructure	went	up	between	1933	and	1940	.	.	.	.	 N ever	in	 the	
country’s 	history	has	so	much	been	built	for	so	many	.	.	.	.”	Id.	
25.	 See	KENTUCKY	HERITAGE	COUNCIL,	THE	NEW	DEAL	BUILDS:	A	HISTORIC	CONTEXT	OF	
THE	NEW	DEAL	 IN	EAST	KENTUCKY,	1933	TO	1943	at	16	 2005 ;	Beverly	Bunch,	
Planning	 and	 Financing	 Infrastructure	 in	 the	 Trump	 Years:	 What	 Can	 the	
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decades	progressed	and	the	nation’s	economic	health	recovered,	state	and	
local	 governments	 assumed	 an	 even	 greater	 share	 of	 responsibility	 for	
infrastructure	financing.	By	1960,	excluding	federal	grants,	state	and	local	
spending	 accounted	 for	 nearly	 70	 percent	 of	 outlays	 on	 infrastructure	
projects	in	the	United	States.26	
States	 and	 localities	 also	 undertook	 significant	 investments	 in	
education.	This	began	with	an	extraordinary	increase	in	public	high	school	
enrollments.	 Barely	 9%	 of	 all	 American	 18‐year‐olds	 graduated	 from	
secondary	 school	 in	 1910.	 By	 1940,	 the	 median	 18‐year‐old	 had	 a	 high	
school	 diploma	 and	 73%	 of	 teens	 were	 in	 a	 secondary	 program.27	 As	
Harvard	 economists	 Claudia	Goldin	 and	Lawrence	Katz	 have	 shown,	 this	
“rising	supply	of	educated	workers	outstripped	the	increased	demand	 for	
them 	 caused	 by	 technological	 advances,”	 leading	 to	 “ h igher	 real	
incomes	.	.	.	 accompanied	by	 lower	 inequality.”28	Robust	 state	 investment	
in	 elementary	 and	 secondary	 schooling	 continued	 well	 into	 the	 1970s.	
According	 to	 sociologist	 Salvatore	 Babones,	 “ b etween	 1964	 and	 1974	
state	 and	 local	 governments	 created	 more	 than	 2.4	 million	 new	 jobs	 in	
education”	to	meet	the	needs	of	growing	student	populations.29	
To	 respond	 to	 the	mounting	 demand	 for	 skilled	workers,	 states	 also	
invested	 substantially	 in	 public	 colleges	 and	 universities.	 Between	 1960	
and	1980,	states	boosted	their	public	higher	education	expenditures	from	






26.	 See	 Barry	 Bosworth	 &	 Sveta	 Milusheva,	 Innovations	 in	 U.S.	 Infrastructure	
Financing:	 An	 Evaluation,	 BROOKINGS	 INSTITUTION	 19	 2011 ,	
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/1020_infrastruc
ture_financing_bosworth_milusheva.pdf	 https://perma.cc/SD4D‐WQ6Q .	
27.	 See	 CLAUDIA	 GOLDIN	 &	 LAWRENCE	 F.	 KATZ,	 THE	 RACE	 BETWEEN	 EDUCATION	 AND	
TECHNOLOGY	195	 2008 .	
28.	 Id.	at	7.	
29.	 See	SALVATORE	BABONES,	 SIXTEEN	FOR	 ‘16:	A	PROGRESSIVE	AGENDA	FOR	A	BETTER	
AMERICA	19	 2015 .	
30.	 See	State	 Investment	and	Disinvestment	 in	Higher	Education	1961	to	2015	
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to	 869,31	 accommodating	 a	 rise	 in	 public	 enrollments	 of	 nearly	 seven	
million	students.32	
States	 reaped	 important	 returns	 on	 these	 investments.	 Affordable	
public	 higher	 education	 fostered	 widespread	 social	 benefits,	 including	
“higher	 income,	 lower	 unemployment,	 better	 health,	 longer	 life,	 faster	
technology	creation	and	adaption,	reduced	crime,	greater	tolerance,	 and 	
increased	 civic	 involvement.”33	 Evidence	 suggests	 that	 states	 likely	 also	
enjoyed	 a	 positive	 fiscal	 return	 on	 their	 public	 college	 and	 university	
expenditures.34	
Finally,	 states	 committed	 to	 provide	 healthcare	 for	 millions	 of	 their	
poorest	 residents.	 In	 1965,	 federal	 legislation	 established	 the	 Medicaid	
program	 to	 supply	 government‐financed	 health	 coverage	 for	 people	
receiving	 welfare	 assistance.	 Medicaid	 was	 designed	 as	 a	 state‐federal	
partnership.	 From	 its	 inception,	 states	have	 taken	 responsibility	 for	over	
two‐fifths	of	the	program’s	funding.35	
B.		 The	Retrenchment	Age	
Since	 the	 late	 1970s,	 states’	 priorities	 have	 shifted	 markedly.	
Residents’	 needs	 have	 remained	 substantial,	 particularly	 as	 increased	
global	 competition	 has	 placed	 downward	 pressure	 on	 wages	 and	 a	
premium	on	higher	education.	The	population	has	also	grown	even	more	




YEARS,	 1949–50	 THROUGH	 2011‐12	 2012 ,	 https://nces.ed.gov/programs/	
digest/d12/tables/dt12_306.asp	 https://perma.cc/3TSZ‐VMYS .	
32.	 See	NAT’L	CTR	FOR	EDUC.	STAT.,	2012	DIGEST	OF	EDUCATION	STATISTICS,	TABLE	254:	





34.	 See	 JOHN	 STILES	 ET	 AL.,	 CALIFORNIA’S	 ECONOMIC	 PAYOFF:	 INVESTING	 IN	 COLLEGE	
ACCESS	 &	 COMPLETION	 6	 2012 .	 Studies	 have	 found	 that	 a	 state	 recoups	
anywhere	from	$2.5	to	$7.5	dollars	for	every	$1	it	invests	in	its	public,	four‐
year	 university	 system.	 See	 Trostel,	 supra	 note	 19,	 at	 32	 top‐left‐hand	
figure .	
35.	 See	 KAISER	 COMM’N	 ON	MEDICAID	&	UNINSURED,	MEDICAID:	 A	 PRIMER	 31	 2013 ,	
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/7334‐05.pdf	
https://perma.cc/E76Q‐UFJH .	
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million.36	 Unlike	 during	 the	 Investment	 Age	 described	 above,	 however,	
states’	 ability	 to	 provide	 high‐quality	 public	 services	 has	 waned	
dramatically.	 This	 trend	 has	 particularly	 affected	 four	 areas	 of	 public	
investment:	 infrastructure,	 K‐12	 education,	 higher	 education,	 and	 public	
health.	
1.	 Crumbling	Infrastructure	
State	 and	 local	 expenditures	on	 infrastructure	now	stand	at	 a	 thirty‐
year	low.37	In	constant	terms,	and	excluding	federal	grants,	total	state	and	
local	 spending	 on	 infrastructure	 fell	 from	 3.3%	 of	 GDP	 in	 the	 1960s	 to	
2.1%	of	 GDP	 in	 the	 early	 2000s.38	While	 capital	 investments	 on	 schools,	
bridges,	 and	other	projects	 rose	 from	0.5%	 to	3%	of	GDP	between	1945	
and	 the	mid‐1970s,	 it	 has	 since	 dipped	 to	 below	 2%.39	 As	 noted	 above,	
these	 figures	are	significant	because	 state	and	 local	governments	 finance	
three‐quarters	of	the	nation’s	infrastructure.40	
Decades	 of	 neglect	 have	 led	 much‐needed	 airports,	 roadways,	 and	
buildings	 to	 fall	 into	 disrepair.	 The	 American	 Society	 of	 Civil	 Engineers	
ASCE 	recently	gave	the	country’s	 infrastructure	a	D 	rating,	estimating	
the	 cost	 of	 upgrading	 it	 at	 $2	 trillion.41	 These	 deficiencies	 highlight	 the	
extent	of	the	need	for	renewed	investment.	Despite	serving	more	than	two	
million	 passengers	 a	 day,	 U.S.	 airports	 face	 a	 funding	 gap	 of	 $42	 billion	
	
36.	 See	U.S.	 CENSUS	BUREAU	POPULATION	DIVISION,	 ESTIMATES	 OF	 THE	COMPONENTS	 OF	




37.	 See	Elizabeth	McNichol,	 It’s	Time	 for	States	 to	 Invest	 in	 Infrastructure,	CTR.	






41.	 See	 AM.	 SOC’Y	 OF	 CIV.	 ENGINEERS,	 AMERICA’S	 INFRASTRUCTURE	 REPORT	 CARD	 5,	 7	
2017 ,	 http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org	 https://perma.cc/B9DS‐
NE6S .	 The	 ASCE’s	 grading	 scale	 runs	 from	 a	 high	 of	 “A”	 indicating	 that	
infrastructure	 is	 “exceptional”	 and	 “fit	 for	 the	 future” 	 to	 a	 low	 of	 “F”	
meaning	 that	 it	 is	 “failing/critical” .	 Id.	 at	 12‐13.	 A	 “D”	 grade	 denotes	
“infrastructure	 that 	is	in	poor	to	fair	condition	and	mostly	below	standard,	
with	many	 elements	 approaching	 the	 end	 of	 their	 service	 life”	 and	whose	
“ c ondition	and	capacity	are	of	serious	concern	with	strong	risk	of	failure.”	
Id.	at	13.	
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over	the	next	decade.42	Almost	four	in	ten	bridges	across	the	country	are	at	
least	 fifty	 years	old.	Of	 the	nation’s	 approximately	614,000	bridges,	 over	
56,000	 are	 structurally	 deficient.43	 The	 number	 of	 high‐hazard	 potential	
dams	across	the	nation	has	also	climbed	to	nearly	15,500.44	
Beyond	 creating	 safety	 concerns,	 this	 lack	 of	 upkeep	 has	 produced	
significant	economic	inefficiencies.	According	to	a	2012	study	by	the	Texas	
A&M	Transportation	 Institute,	 the	annual	 cost	of	 congestion	has	 risen	 to	
$121	 billion,	 or	 $818	 per	 commuter.45	 The	 country	 stands	 to	 lose	 $14.2	










45.	 See	 NAT’L	 ASS’N	 OF	 MANUFACTURERS,	 CATCHING	 UP:	 GREATER	 FOCUS	 NEEDED	 TO	




FORBES	 Mar.	 13,	 2017 ,	 https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/	
2017/03/13/the‐massive‐cost‐of‐americas‐crumbling‐infrastructure‐
infographic/#41a829653978	 https://perma.cc/5RDQ‐B4CZ .	
47.	 See	 EDUC.	 LAW	 CTR	 &	 THE	 LEADERSHIP	 CONFERENCE	 EDUC.	 FUND,	 CHEATING	 OUR	
FUTURE:	 HOW	 DECADES	 OF	 DISINVESTMENT	 BY	 STATES	 JEOPARDIZES	 EQUAL	





performance	 of	.	.	.	 students	 and	 the	 low	 funding	 provided	 their	 schools.’”	
Valerie	Strauss,	How	Grossly	Underfunded	Are	Public	 Schools?,	WASH.	POST	
Nov.	 25,	 2012 ,	 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer‐
sheet/wp/2012/11/25/how‐grossly‐underfunded‐are‐public‐schools												
https://perma.cc/G77V‐4L56 	 quoting	 Montoy	 v.	 State,	 No.	 99‐C‐1738,	
2003	WL	22902963	 Kan.	Dist.	Ct.,	3d	Jud.	Dist.	Dec.	2,	2003 .	
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have	hit	underserved	communities	especially	hard.48	As	the	Education	Law	
Center	 recently	 observed,	 “ t he	 evidence	 from	 across	 the	 country	 is	
clear : 	 .	.	.	 our	nation	must	dramatically	 increase	 the	 resources	available	
for	public	education.”49	
Throughout	the	country,	states	and	school	districts	have	deferred	vital	
funding	 for	 school	 facilities.	 Research	 shows	 that	 school	 districts	 need	
high‐quality	 facilities	 to	 help	 “improve	 student	 achievement,	 reduce	
truancy	 and	 suspensions,	 and 	 improve	 staff	 satisfaction	 and	 retention	
.	.	.	.”50	 Yet	 the	 21st	 Century	 School	 Fund	 recently	 estimated	 that	 states	





4.5%	 of	 GDP	 on	 elementary	 and	 high	 school	 education.53	 By	 2013,	 that	
figure	 had	 dropped	 a	 full	 point,	 to	 3.5%.54	 This	 level	 lies	 below	 the	
Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Cooperation	 and	 Development’s	 OECD 	
average	 expenditure	 of	 3.6%	 of	 GDP.55	 It	 also	 falls	 well	 short	 of	 the	
	
48.	 See	EDUC.	L.	CTR	&	LEADERSHIP	CONFERENCE	EDUC.	FUND,	supra	note	47,	at	3.	The	
highest	 poverty	 districts	 in	 America	 now	 receive	 about	 $1,200	 less	 per	
student	than	their	more	affluent	counterparts.	Id.	
49.	 Id.	
50.	 21ST	 CENTURY	 SCHOOL	 FUND	 AND	NAT’L	 COUNCIL	 ON	 SCHOOL	 FACILITIES,	 STATE	 OF	




52.	 See	 AM.	 SOC’Y	 OF	 CIV.	 ENGINEERS,	 supra	 note	 41,	 at	 81.	 The	 ASCE’s	 2017	
Infrastructure	 Report	 Card	 also	 found	 that	 no	 fewer	 than	 24	 percent	 of	




ENROLLMENT,	TOTAL	EXPENDITURES	 IN	CONSTANT	DOLLARS,	 AND	EXPENDITURES	AS	 A	
PERCENTAGE	 OF	 THE	 GROSS	 DOMESTIC	 PRODUCT	 GDP ,	 BY	 LEVEL	 OF	 EDUCATION,	
SELECTED	 YEARS,	 1965‐66	 THROUGH	 2014‐15	 2015 ,	 https://nces.ed.gov/	
programs/digest/d15/figures/fig_02.asp	 https://perma.cc/CT7T‐QRZV .	
54.	 Id.	
55.	 See	 NAT’L	 CTR.	 FOR	 EDUC.	 STAT.,	 THE	 CONDITION	 OF	 EDUCATION:	 EDUCATION	
EXPENDITURES	 BY	 COUNTRY	 2017 ,	 https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/	
indicator_cmd.asp	 https://perma.cc/SBN9‐YT34 .	
STARVING THE STATEHOUSE  
 357 
thresholds	 set	 by	 nations	 recognized	 as	 global	 leaders	 in	 education.56	 In	




on	 individual	 states	 paints	 a	 concerning	 portrait.	 California,	 the	 most	
populous	state	in	the	nation,	is	a	telling	example.	Scholars	estimate	that	to	
bring	 all	 schools	 to	 the	 2011–12	 State	 Board	 of	 Education‐established	
achievement	 targets	 under	 the	 federal	 No	 Child	 Left	 Behind	 standards,	
California	 would	 need	 to	 spend	 an	 additional	 $42	 billion	 a	 year—the	
equivalent	of	about	a	quarter	of	the	state’s	entire	annual	budget.	The	state	
would	 also	 need	 to	 hire	 over	 237,000	 additional	 instructional	 aides	 and	
educators.59	
3.	 Defunded	Public	Colleges	
States	 have	 also	 retrenched	 higher	 education.	 Public	 colleges	 and	
universities	now	educate	nearly	 seventy	percent	 of	American	 students.60	
Yet	 states	 have	 failed	 to	 provide	 these	 institutions	 with	 the	 resources	
needed	 to	meet	 growing	 and	more	 diverse	 populations.61	 Between	 1988	
and	 2013,	 states	 decreased	 their	 average	 public	 higher	 education	
expenditures	 per	 full‐time‐enrolled	 student	 from	 $8,579	 to	 $6,105.62	 As	
	
56.	 See	 LynNell	 Hancock,	 Why	 Are	 Finland’s	 Schools	 Successful?,	 SMITHSONIAN	
MAG.	 Sept.	2011 ,	https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/why‐are‐
finlands‐schools‐successful‐49859555/	 https://perma.cc/55A6‐ASR6 .	
57.	 See	 NAT’L	 CTR.	 FOR	 EDUC.	 STAT.,	 2016	 DIGEST	 OF	 EDUCATION	 STATISTICS,	 TABLE	
605.20:	 PUBLIC	 AND	 PRIVATE	 EXPENDITURES	 ON	 EDUCATION	 INSTITUTIONS	 AS	 A	
PERCENTAGE	OF	THE	GROSS	DOMESTIC	PRODUCT	 GDP ,	BY	LEVEL	OF	EDUCATION	AND	




59.	 See	 CAL.	 SCH.	 BOARDS	 ASS’N,	 CALIFORNIA’S	 CHALLENGE:	 ADEQUATELY	 FUNDING	
EDUCATION	 IN	 THE	 21ST	 CENTURY	 2	 2015 ,	 https://www.csba.org/	
CAchallenge2015	 https://perma.cc/J8JY‐FVYJ .	
60.	 See	 NAT’L	 CTR.	 FOR	 EDUC.	 STAT.,	 2013	 DIGEST	 OF	 EDUCATION	 STATISTICS:	 TABLE	
307.20	 2013 ,	 https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/tables/	
dt13_307.20.asp	 https://perma.cc/8K44‐8EBL .	
61.	 See	 John	 Quinterno,	 The	 Great	 Cost	 Shift,	 DEMOS	 2	 Mar.	 2012 ,	
https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/TheGreatCostShift
_Demos_0.pdf	 https://perma.cc/Q7R7‐Z7AN .	
62.	 See	 STATE	 HIGHER	 EDUC.	 EXEC.	 OFFICERS,	 STATE	 HIGHER	 EDUCATION	 FINANCE:	 FY	
2013	 at	 18,	 http://www.sheeo.org/sites/default/files/publications/SHEF	
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have	 foregone	 tertiary	 instruction	 altogether.65	 States	 have	 thereby	




measuring	 such	 spending	 is	 difficult	 due	 to	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 U.S.	
health	 system,66	 recent	 studies	 have	 shown	 that	 states’	 public	 health	
	
_FY13_04292014.pdf	 https://perma.cc/HJ39‐SEMR .	The	proportion	of	 tax	
revenues	 states	 have	 invested	 in	 higher	 education	 has	 fallen	 even	 more	
precipitously	in	recent	decades.	In	1981,	states	spent	an	average	of	$10.47	in	
tax	 revenues	per	$1,000	of	personal	 income	on	public	 colleges.	 Since	 then,	






OF	 INSTITUTION	 AND	 STATE	 JURISDICTION,	 2000,	 2010,	 AND	 2011	 2012 ,	
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d12/tables/dt12_381.asp	 https://	
perma.cc/WE5E‐6SAH .	 Stagnant	 wages	 have	 aggravated	 the	 burden	 this	
shift	has	placed	on	 the	poor;	while	 the	cost	of	attending	a	public	 four‐year	
institution	 inched	 from	six	percent	 to	nine	percent	of	 the	highest	quintile’s	
family	 income	in	the	past	two	decades,	 the	 lowest	quintile	saw	this	burden	
more	than	double,	from	42	percent	to	114	percent	of	their	earnings.	SUZANNE	
METTLER,	 DEGREES	 OF	 INEQUALITY:	 HOW	 THE	 POLITICS	 OF	 HIGHER	 EDUCATION	
SABOTAGED	THE	AMERICAN	DREAM	121	 2014 .	
64.	 See	 Jean	 Johnson	&	 Jon	Rochkind,	With	Their	Whole	Lives	Ahead	of	Them:	
Myths	and	Realities	About	Why	So	Many	Students	Fail	to	Finish	College	5‐11	
Pub.	 Agenda,	 2010 ,	 https://www.publicagenda.org/files/theirwholelives	
aheadofthem.pdf	 https://perma.cc/78SH‐GJ57 .	
65.	 See	Donald	E.	Heller,	Student	Price	Response	in	Higher	Education:	An	Update	
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investments	 have	 stagnated	 in	 the	 last	 ten	 years.67	 Data	 from	 the	
Association	 of	 State	 and	 Territorial	 Health	 Officials	 have	 revealed	 that	
“ s tate	public	health	spending	 was 	actually	 lower	in	2016‐2017	than	it	
was	in	2008‐2009	.	.	.	.”68	As	with	infrastructure	and	education,	this	lack	of	
spending	is	concerning	because	state	and	local	governments	take	the	lead	
in	 public	 health	 financing;	 over	 the	 past	 few	 decades,	 they	 have	 been	




transformation	 over	 the	 past	 eighty	 years.	 During	 the	 first	 half	 of	 this	
period,	 states	 made	 remarkable	 new	 investments	 in	 infrastructure,	




This	 structural	 shift	 has	 significant	 implications	 for	 the	 health	 and	
well‐being	 of	 the	 next	 generation	 of	 Americans.	 By	 failing	 to	 invest	
programs	that	support	social	mobility,70	states	risk	deepening	the	record	
levels	 of	 inequality	 that	 already	 characterize	 the	 twenty‐first‐century	
United	 States.71	 It	 is	 therefore	 crucial	 that	 scholars	 make	 sense	 of	 this	
policy	 transformation’s	 roots	 and	 offer	 legislators	 actionable	 solutions.	
Doing	so	will	require	that	researchers	look	beyond	the	effects	of	the	most	
recent	 recession.	 In	 particular,	 they	 will	 need	 to	 dissect	 the	 legal	 and	




67.	 See	 Tran	 et	 al.,	 supra	 note	 19;	 David	 Himmelstein	 &	 Steffie	 Woolhandler,	
Public	Health’s	Falling	Share	of	U.S.	Health	Spending,	106	AM.	J.	PUB.	HEALTH	
56,	 57	 2016 ;	 Albert	 Lang	 et	 al.,	 A	 Funding	 Crisis	 for	 Public	 Health	 and	
Safety:	State‐by‐State	Public	Health	Funding	and	Key	Health	Facts	14	 Trust	










involves	 competing	 expenditure	 commitments.	 While	 states’	 budget	
histories	 remain	 underexplored,	 political	 scientists	 have	 shown	 that	 the	
rising	costs	of	some	public	programs	have	crowded	out	funds	for	essential	
services.72	
Chief	 among	 these	 cost	 drivers	 is	 Medicaid.	 Along	 with	 several	
coverage	 expansions,	 aging	 and	 increasingly	 impoverished	 populations	
have	 pushed	 up	 Medicaid	 enrollments.73	 The	 program	 has	 also	 suffered	
from	 the	 outsized	 cost	 inflation	 characteristic	 of	 the	 American	 medical	
sector.74	 As	 a	 result,	 Medicaid	 now	 consumes	 an	 average	 of	 one‐fifth	 of	
states’	general	 funds,	placing	 intense	pressure	on	other	spending	areas.75	
	
72.	 Popular	 commentators	 often	 lay	 the	 blame	 for	 public	 service	 cuts	 on	
government	 pension	 programs.	 In	 most	 states,	 however,	 unfunded	
retirement	 liabilities	mainly	pose	a	 future	 threat.	 See	 Irvis	Lav	&	Elizabeth	
McNichol,	 Misunderstandings	 Regarding	 State	 Debt,	 Pensions,	 and	 Retiree	
Health	 Costs	 Create	 Unnecessary	 Alarm,	 CTR.	 ON	 BUDGET	 &	 POL’Y	 PRIORITIES	
Jan.	 20	 2011 ,	 https://www.cbpp.org/research/misunderstandings‐
regarding‐state‐debt‐pensions‐and‐retiree‐health‐costs‐create‐unnecessary	
https://perma.cc/B5UQ‐UGEV .	 Contrary	 to	 misconceptions	 about	 the	
solvency	 of	 public	 pensions,	most	 state	 and	 local	 governments	 can	 spread	
the	 costs	 of	 unfunded	 liabilities	 over	 up	 to	 30	 years.	 Id.	 at	 4.	Nonetheless,	
aging	populations	and	maturing	obligations	may	soon	force	states	to	adjust	
policies	to	prevent	retirement	costs	from	encroaching	on	other	programs.	D.	
Roderick	 Kiewiet	 &	 Mathew	 D.	 McCubbins,	 State	 and	 Local	 Government	
Finance:	The	New	Fiscal	 Ice	Age,	17	ANN.	REV.	POL.	SCI.	105,	113‐17	 2014 .	
The	Congressional	Budget	Office	 indeed	 recently	 concluded	 that	 “ m ost	of	
the	additional	funding	needed	to	cover	pension	liabilities	is	likely	to	take	the	
form	of	higher	government	contributions	and	 therefore	will	 require	higher	
taxes	 or	 reduced	 government	 services	 for	 residents.”	 Frank	 Russek,	 The	





Drivers	 of	 Costs,	 PEW	 CHARITABLE	 TRUSTS	 5	 2014 ,																																						
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/data‐visualizations/interactives/	
2014/medicaid/downloadables/state_health_care_spending_on_medicaid.	
pdf	 https://perma.cc/B39C‐6ZBY .	 	 This	 inflation	 largely	 stems	 from	 the	
lack	of	a	central	government	insurer	capable	of	streamlining	administrative	
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Studies	 have	 shown	 that	 increased	 Medicaid	 spending	 has	 taken	 a	
particularly	 harsh	 toll	 on	public	higher	 education	 investment	 in	 the	past	
30	years.76	
Research	has	 similarly	 found	 that	 climbing	prison	 costs	 form	part	 of	
the	picture.	Between	1972	and	2012,	the	incarceration	rate	in	the	United	
States	 soared	 from	 161	 to	 707	 people	 per	 100,000	 residents.77	Much	 of	
this	 rise	 occurred	 in	 state	 prisons,	 as	 voters	 and	 legislators	 adopted	
stricter	 sentencing	 laws	 for	 petty	 offenders	 and	 drug	 users.78	
Unsurprisingly,	 multiplying	 numbers	 of	 inmates	 inflated	 prison	 budgets	
and	drew	funds	away	from	public	programs.79	
Finally,	 American	 states	 and	 localities	 have	 incurred	 higher	
infrastructure	 costs	 than	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 world.80	 To	 take	 just	 one	
example,	 New	 York	 City’s	 rail	 extensions	 can	 now	 cost	 as	 much	 as	 $3	
billion	per	kilometer—15	times	the	cost	of	equivalent	projects	in	Paris	and	
	
76.	 See	 generally	 David	 Tandberg,	 Interest	 Groups	 and	 Governmental	
Institutions:	 The	 Politics	 of	 State	 Funding	 of	 Public	 Higher	 Education,	 24	
EDUC.	 POL’Y	 735,	 768	 2010 	 finding	 that	 Medicaid	 is	 area	 of	 spending	
“siphoning	 dollars	 from	 higher	 education” ;	 Thomas	 J.	 Kane	 &	 Peter	 R.	
Orszag,	Higher	Education	Spending:	The	Role	of	Medicaid	and	the	Business	
Cycle	 Brookings	 Institution,	 Policy	 Brief	 #124,	 2003 ,	
https://www.brookings.edu/research/higher‐education‐spending‐the‐role‐
of‐medicaid‐and‐the‐business‐cycle/	 https://perma.cc/MUG2‐M2R6 	
finding	 that	 “Medicaid	 spending	 appears	 to	 explain	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	
the	.	.	.	decline	in	higher	education	appropriations” .	
77.	 See	 Jeremy	 Travis,	 Bruce	 Western,	 &	 Steve	 Redburn,	 Rising	 Incarceration	
Rates,	in	THE	GROWTH	OF	INCARCERATION	IN	THE	UNITED	STATES:	EXPLORING	CAUSES	
AND	 CONSEQUENCES	 33	 Nat’l	 Res.	 Council	 of	 the	 Nat’l	 Acad.	 of	 Sci.,	 2014 ,	
https://www.nap.edu/read/18613/chapter/4	 https://perma.cc/RMD4‐
QWXH .	




79.	 See	 Christian	 Henrichson	 &	 Ruth	 Delaney,	 The	 Price	 of	 Prisons:	 What	
Incarceration	 Costs	 Taxpayers,	 VERA	 INST.	 OF	 JUST.	 2	 2012 ,	 https://www	
.vera.org/publications/price‐of‐prisons‐what‐incarceration‐costs‐taxpayers	
https://perma.cc/EF4M‐T5X7 ;	 David	 J.	 Weerts	 &	 Justin	 M.	 Ronca,	
Understanding	 Differences	 in	 State	 Support	 for	 Higher	 Education	 Across	
States,	Sectors,	and	Institutions:	A	Longitudinal	Study,	83	J.	HIGHER	EDUC.	155,	
167	 2012 .	
80.	 See	 Tracy	 Gordon	 &	 David	 Schleicher,	 High	 Costs	 May	 Explain	 Crumbling	
Support	 for	 US	 Infrastructure,	 Urban	 Inst.	 Mar.	 31,	 2015 ,	 http://www	
.urban.org/urban‐wire/high‐costs‐may‐explain‐crumbling‐support‐us‐
infrastructure	 https://perma.cc/2S4A‐K5JE .	
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36	times	the	cost	of	similar	construction	in	Madrid.81	Elevated	costs	have	
almost	certainly	made	 it	more	difficult	 to	get	new	 infrastructure	projects	
up	and	running.	
Nevertheless,	 the	 scale	of	 states’	under‐investment	 in	public	 services	
implies	 that	 other	 forces	 are	 also	 at	 work.	 Even	 assuming	 that	 states	
reduced	 their	 prison	 populations	 and	 found	 ways	 to	 keep	 health	 and	
construction	 prices	 in	 check,	 these	 savings	 would	 not	 make	 up	 for	 the	
decades‐long	 shortfalls	 that	 have	 sapped	 public	 programs.	 The	 fact	 that	
expenditures	 have	 failed	 to	 meet	 populations’	 needs	 across	 most	 major	
budget	categories82	suggests	 that	 this	 is	not	a	story	of	profligacy	 in	some	
policy	 areas.	 Instead,	 this	 level	 of	 uniformity	 points	 to	 a	 more	 obvious	
culprit:	 insufficient	 tax	 receipts.	This	 section	 first	 shows	 that	 states	have	
grappled	with	 two	 serious	 revenue	 challenges	 in	 the	 past	 forty	 years.	 It	






for	 expenditures	 that	 pays	 no	 attention	 to	 ensuring	 that	 revenues	 cover	
expenditures	 is	 not	 a	 budget.”83	 For	 the	most	 part,	 these	 revenues	 come	
from	state	and	 local	 taxes.	 State	budgets	 reveal	 “citizens’	preferences	 for	
different	 forms	of	 taxation	and	different	 levels	of	 taxation,	 as	well	 as	 the	
ability	of	specific	groups	to	shift	tax	burdens	to	others.	The	budget	reflects	







at	 6	 2016 ,	 https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/NASBO/	
9d2d2db1‐c943‐4f1b‐b750‐0fca152d64c2/UploadedImages/SER	
%20Archive/State%20Expenditure%20Report%20 Fiscal%202014‐2016 	
%20‐%20S.pdf	 https://perma.cc/VJ79‐EMH5 	 breaking	state	budgets	into	
the	 following	 categories,	 most	 of	 which—see	 supra,	 Section	 I.B—suffered	
significant	cutbacks	beginning	in	the	late	1970s:	elementary	and	secondary	
education;	 higher	 education;	 public	 assistance;	 Medicaid;	 corrections;	
transportation;	other .	
83.	 IRENE	 S.	 RUBIN,	 THE	 POLITICS	 OF	 PUBLIC	 BUDGETING:	 GETTING	 AND	 SPENDING,	
BORROWING	AND	BALANCING	4	 4th	ed.	2000 .	
84.	 Id.	at	2.	
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displace	other	public	programs	have	foregone	a	discussion	of	taxation.85	In	
doing	 so,	 they	 have	 intimated	 that	 states’	 resource	 woes	 stem	 entirely	
from	competing	expenditure	choices.	
A	 close	 look	 at	 states’	 fiscal	 portraits	 shows	 that	 this	 could	 not	 be	
further	from	the	truth.	States	have	encountered	two	major	revenue‐based	
hurdles	 in	the	Retrenchment	Age	described	in	the	previous	section.	First,	
and	most	 importantly,	 tax	receipts	have	stagnated	since	the	 late	1970s.86	
Average	 state	 tax	 revenues	per	 $1,000	of	 personal	 income	 climbed	 from	
$34	to	$61	between	1951	and	1976	 Figure	1 .	Since	then,	however,	 this	
figure	has	essentially	 flattened.	Average	state	 tax	 revenues	per	$1,000	of	
personal	 income	 reached	 just	 $63.15	 at	 the	 height	 of	 the	 2007	 housing	












85.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Kane	 &	 Orszag,	 supra	 note	 76;	 Albert	 A.	 Okunade,	 What	 Factors	
Influence	 State	 Appropriations	 for	 Public	 Higher	 Education	 in	 the	 United	

























































SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census; Bureau of Economic Analysis; 
author’s own calculations.
Figure 1. Tax Revenues Per $1,000 of Personal Income, All States, 1951 to 
2013. 
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This	 shift	 cannot	 solely	 be	 attributed	 to	 exogenous	 forces	 such	 as	
slowed	 economic	 growth	 or	 globalization.	 Other	 developed	 democracies	
have	 avoided	 revenue	 stagnation	 while	 maintaining	 healthy	 economies.	




some	 of	 the	 highest‐quality	 public	 services	 and	 education	 systems	 on	
earth.89	These	differences	 indicate	 that	 poorly‐designed	 tax	policies	have	
played	a	role	in	impairing	U.S.	states’	budget	health.	
A	 second	 pernicious	 trend	 has	 plagued	 U.S.	 states	 in	 recent	 years:	




the	 past	 decade.90	 On	 average,	 every	 one	 percentage	 point	 change	 in	 a	
state’s	real	per	capita	income	elicited	a	1.8	percentage	point	change	in	its	
real	per	capita	tax	revenues.91	Such	volatility	has	produced	deeper	public	
service	 cuts	during	 recessions,	 lengthened	 the	amount	of	 time	needed	 to	
	
87.	 See	ORG.	FOR	ECON.	COOPERATION	AND	DEV.,	REVENUE	STATISTICS:	TAX	REVENUE	AS	A	




1990 ;	 Emanuele	 Ferragina	 &	 Martin	 Seeleib‐Kaiser,	 Welfare	 Regime	
Debate:	 Past,	 Present,	 Futures?,	 39	 POL’Y	 &	 POL.	 583,	 584‐85	 2011 ;	 Paul	
Pierson,	 Coping	 with	 Permanent	 Austerity:	Welfare	 State	 Restructuring	 in	
Affluent	Democracies,	43	REVUE	FRANÇAISE	DE	SOCIOLOGIE	369,	388‐92	 2002 ;	
Abby	 Jackson,	 Finland	 Has	 One	 of	 the	 World’s	 Best	 Education	 Systems.	




90.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Gary	 C.	 Cornia	 &	 Ray	 D.	 Nelson,	 State	 Tax	 Revenue	 Growth	 and	









91.	 See	Kodrzycki,	supra	note	90,	at	17	 examining	trends	from	2000	to	2012 .	
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restore	 program	 funding,	 and	 impaired	 leaders’	 ability	 to	 plan	 for	 the	
future.92	
Probing	 the	 mystery	 of	 states’	 long‐run	 disinvestment	 therefore	
prompts	 deeper	 questions	 about	 their	 tax	 policy	 choices.	 The	 data	 show	
that	 stagnant	 and	 volatile	 tax	 revenue	 has	 constrained	 states’	 ability	 to	
fund	 public	 programs,	 especially	 as	 these	 programs	 have	 become	 more	
expensive.	 To	 get	 at	 the	 roots	 of	 these	 problems,	 legal	 scholars	 need	 to	
answer	 two	 specific	 questions.	 First,	 how	 have	 changing	 tax	 institutions	




Legal	 scholars	 have	 yet	 to	 closely	 investigate	 these	 problems.	While	
there	has	been	some	research	on	the	origins	of	tax	structures,	much	of	 it	
has	 remained	 confined	 to	 federal	 law.	 Legal	 writing	 examining	 state	
institutions	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 prospective	 economic	 effects	 of	 reform	
proposals.	 This	 opens	 a	 space	 to	 investigate	 both	 how	 tax	 laws	 have	




Ian	 Shapiro	 explained	 how	 a	 group	 of	 conservative	 reformers	 waged	 a	
thirty‐year	 campaign	 to	 repeal	 the	 estate	 tax.93	 In	 more	 recent	 work,	
Graetz	has	called	for	the	United	States	to	simplify	its	tax	code	and	stabilize	
revenue	 by	 adopting	 a	 value‐added	 tax	 VAT ,	 like	 the	 kind	 found	
throughout	Europe.94	Eric	Zolt	has	urged	federal	lawmakers	to	update	tax	









95.	 See	 Eric	 M.	 Zolt,	 Inequality	 in	 America:	 Challenges	 for	 Tax	 and	 Spending	
Policies,	66	TAX	L.	REV.	641,	641	 2013 .	
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accurately	 reflect	 changing	 poverty	 demographics96	 and	 family	
configurations.97	
For	 the	most	part,	 scholars	have	not	 similarly	explored	 the	 legal	and	
political	changes	responsible	for	states’	budget	woes.	Kirk	Stark	 is	one	of	
the	few	authors	who	has	embarked	on	such	a	project.	In	a	seminal	paper,	
he	 unearthed	 federal	 laws	 that	 have	 precluded	 states	 from	 controlling	
revenue	 volatility.98	 Stark	 outlined	 a	 series	 of	 conformity	 incentives,	
subsidies,	statutes,	and	judicial	decisions	that	have	prevented	legislatures	




state’s	 tax	 system	 and	 elaborated	 forward‐looking	 reforms	 intended	 to	
cure	 it.	 Rather	 than	 look	 back	 at	 how	 a	 range	 of	 intertwined	 legal	
structures	 evolved	 to	 promote	 an	 ongoing	 fiscal	 crisis,	 this	 research	 has	
built	 on	 economic	 theory	 to	 help	 lawmakers	 strengthen	 future	 state	
budgets.	
In	a	separate	article	co‐authored	with	Brian	Galle,	 for	 instance,	 Stark	
proposed	 policies	 to	 help	 states	 save	 the	 money	 needed	 to	 weather	
recessions.100	Noting	the	weaknesses	of	many	states’	rainy‐day	funds,	their	
paper	outlined	federal	legal	reforms	designed	to	boost	state	contributions	
and	 limit	 unnecessary	 withdrawals	 during	 boom	 periods.101	 Galle	 and	
Stark	clearly	acknowledged	the	revenue	volatility	that	states	grapple	with	
at	 the	 start	 of	 their	 article.	 Nonetheless,	 they	 centered	 their	 analysis	 on	
policy	proposals	 that	economics	suggests	could	boost	government	saving	
down	the	road.	
David	 Gamage	 has	 also	 tackled	 state‐level	 concerns	 using	 economic	
principles.	In	a	2010	article,	Gamage	highlighted	the	threat	that	slow	and	




97.	 See	Anne	L.	Alstott,	 Updating	 the	Welfare	 State:	Marriage,	 the	 Income	Tax,	








102.	 See	 David	 Gamage,	 Preventing	 State	 Budget	 Crises:	 Managing	 the	 Fiscal	
Volatility	Problem,	98	CALIF.	L.	REV.	749,	751	 2010 .	
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theory—which	 focuses	 on	 how	 economic	 actors	 can	 most	 effectively	
spread	 risk—he	 encouraged	 lawmakers	 to	 confront	 instability	 by	
adjusting	 broad‐based	 tax	 rates.103	 Gamage	 explained	 that	 such	 rates	






2014	 study,	 he	 underlined	 that	 property	 taxes	withered	 in	 the	 last	 half‐
century	as	states	restricted	their	rates	and	let	them	fall	out	of	step	with	the	
economy.107	 He	 thereby	 outlined	 a	 detailed	 reform	 plan	 based	 on	
withholding	for	individuals	paying	property	tax	on	residential	land.108	Like	
the	proposals	Stark	and	Gamage	put	forward,	Shanske’s	analysis	primarily	
explored	 the	 lessons	 that	 economic	 theory	 holds	 for	 aspiring	 tax	
reformers.	
These	studies	are	rich	in	policy	prescriptions	and	have	made	valuable	
additions	 to	 the	 field.	 From	 an	 empirical	 perspective,	 however,	 this	
scholarship	 has	 left	 the	 two	 foregoing	 questions	 largely	 unanswered:	




IV	of	 this	paper	describes	 in	more	detail,	 social	scientists	have	started	 to	
interrogate	 the	 relationship	 between	 taxation	 and	 social	 change.	 Fiscal	
sociologists,	 in	particular,	have	 trained	 their	 sights	on	 the	ways	 in	which	




105.	 See	 David	 Gamage	 &	 Devin	 J.	 Heckman,	 A	 Better	 Way	 Forward	 for	 State	
Taxation	of	E‐Commerce,	92	B.U.	L.	REV.	483,	497‐516	 2012 .	







See	 generally	 Isaac	 William	 Martin	 &	 Monica	 Prasad,	 Taxes	 and	 Fiscal	
Sociology,	 40	 ANN.	 REV.	 SOC.	 331	 2014 	 reviewing	 contributions	 of	 “fiscal	
sociology”	research	to	the	study	of	poverty	and	inequality .	
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scholarship	remains	in	its	infancy.110	It	has	also	mainly	focused	on	nations	
or	 on	 comparisons	 between	 them,	 rather	 than	 on	 sub‐national	 entities	
such	 as	U.S.	 states.	 Researchers	 therefore	 still	 have	much	 to	 learn	 about	
states’	tax	histories.	
Legal	scholars	have	important	contributions	to	make	to	these	debates.	
As	 is	 true	 of	 all	 facets	 of	 capitalist	 markets,111	 tax	 structures	 and	 the	
outcomes	 they	 engender	 are	 the	 product	 of	 laws—including	 state‐level	
statutes,	 regulations,	 ballot	 measures,	 and	 court	 decisions.	 These	 legal	
institutions	 order	 the	 economies	 around	 which	 state	 budgets	 are	 built.	
Because	 tax	 laws	 are	 operationalized	 and	 enforced	 through	 government	
power,	 legal	 scholars	 are	 also	 uniquely	 positioned	 to	 identify	 the	 sites	
where	political	actors	contest	this	authority.	
The	 next	 two	 sections	 are	 designed	 to	 help	 legal	 thinkers	wade	 into	
these	 areas.	 Specifically,	 they	 draw	 on	 existing	work	 in	 political	 science,	
sociology,	and	economics	to	hypothesize	 1 	which	tax	institutions	played	
a	 role	 in	 limiting	 state	 revenue	 over	 the	 past	 forty	 years	 and	 2 	which	
political	 forces	did	 the	most	 to	bring	 this	 change	about.	The	hope	 is	 that	





scholars	must	 first	 grasp	which	 tax	 institutions	 contributed	 to	 slow	 and	
unstable	revenue	growth	in	the	past	forty	years.	Recent	work	in	economics	
suggests	possible	 answers.	As	numerous	 studies	have	noted,	both	 states’	
tax	codes	and	the	social	environments	in	which	they	lie	have	significantly	
transformed	 in	 recent	 decades.	 At	 least	 four	 legal	 shifts	 stand	 out:	 1 	
rising	 Tax	 and	 Expenditure	 Limitations	 TELs 	 and	 Super‐Majority	
Requirements	 SMRs ;	 2 	 withering	 sales	 tax	 regimes;	 3 	 eroding	
corporate	 tax	 bases;	 and	 4 	 multiplying	 tax	 expenditures.	 Becoming	
familiar	with	these	policy	changes	will	allow	legal	researchers	to	test	their	






2014 	 reviewing	Thomas	Piketty’s	Capital	in	the	Twenty‐First	Century .	
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A.		 The	Rise	of	TELs	&	SMRs	
Over	 the	 past	 thirty	 years,	 TELs	 and	 SMRs	 have	 radically	 altered	
states’	 fiscal	 landscapes.	 TELs	 attempt	 to	 limit	 tax	 revenue	 or	 spending	
growth	 by	 linking	 it	 to	 an	 external	 indicator,	 such	 as	 state	 income	
growth.112	SMRs	require	a	supermajority	 often	two‐thirds	or	more 	for	a	
legislature	 to	 approve	 tax	 increases.113	 Beginning	 in	 the	 1970s,	 a	
nationwide	 “tax	 revolt”	propelled	 these	 restrictions	 into	 law	across	most	
states.114	 Seventeen	 states	 adopted	 local	 government	 TELs	 between	 just	
1970	and	1976.115	Similarly,	sixteen	states	enacted	state	government	TELs	
in	the	four	years	after	1977.116	Today,	forty‐six	states	feature	some	form	of	




they	 vary	 considerably	 in	 design,	 scope	 and	 restrictiveness.”119	 Though	
some	 state	 government	 TELs	 constrain	 both	 revenues	 and	 expenditures,	
many	 focus	on	 just	one	or	 the	other.120	About	half	of	 these	provisions	 lie	
embedded	 in	 state	 constitutions;	 the	 rest	 are	 statutory	 in	 nature.121	
Meanwhile,	local	government	TELs	exhibit	an	even	more	dizzying	array	of	
characteristics.	 Experts	 have	 generally	 regrouped	 them	 into	 seven	
categories:	 property	 tax	 rate	 limits	 that	 apply	 to	 all	 local	 governments;	
property	 tax	 rate	 limits	 that	 apply	 to	 specific	 types	 of	 local	 government;	
property	 tax	 levy	 limits;	 general	 revenue	 increase	 limits;	 general	
	








118.	 See	 Bert	Waisanen,	 State	 Tax	 and	 Expenditure	 Limits	 Nat’l	 Conf.	 of	 State	
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expenditure	 increase	 limits;	 limits	 on	 assessment	 increases;	 and	 full	
disclosure	 or	“truth	in	taxation” 	laws.122	
Understanding	 how	 and	 why	 these	 rules	 were	 implemented	 is	
important	 because	 they	 have	 significant	 real‐world	 effects	 on	 state	
budgets.	 While	 these	 rules’	 diversity	 has	 made	 them	 difficult	 to	 study,	
evidence	 has	 increasingly	 suggested	 that	 they	 depress	 state	 revenues.	
Research	conducted	shortly	after	the	first	TELs	came	into	force	tended	to	
conclude	 that	 they	 had	 little	 impact.123	 But	 as	 these	 laws’	 numbers	 and	
longevity	 have	 risen,	 scholars	 have	demonstrated	 their	 influence.	Harold	
Elder	has	revealed	that	TELs	have	a	negative	effect	on	tax	revenue	growth	
after	controlling	for	a	range	of	economic	and	demographic	factors.124	Using	
panel	data	 for	 the	 years	between	1969	and	1994,	Dale	Bails	 and	Maggie	
Tieslau	have	further	shown	that	expenditures	remain	lower	in	states	with	
TELs	 than	 in	 those	 without	 them.125	 Robert	 B.	 Archibald	 and	 David	 H.	
Feldman	 have	 also	 found	 that	 TELs	 and	 SMRs	 enacted	 in	 the	 past	 fifty	
years	 have	 had	 “significant	 adverse	 effects	 on	 state	 appropriations”	 for	
discretionary	programs,	namely	public	higher	education.126	
Interestingly,	local	government	TELs	seem	to	have	a	particularly	harsh	
impact	 on	 states’	 fiscal	 fortunes.	 The	 U.S.	 Advisory	 Commission	 on	
Intergovernmental	 Relations	 has	 noted	 that	 localities	 rely	 on	 large	
infusions	of	state	aid	for	education	and	infrastructure	once	TELs	come	into	












49	 AM.	 J.	 ECON.	 &	 SOC.	 223,	 235	 1990 ;	 James	 Cox	 &	 David	 Lowery,	 The	







127.	 See	 U.S.	 ADVISORY	 COMM’N	 ON	 INTERGOVERNMENTAL	 RELATIONS,	 TAX	 AND	
EXPENDITURE	 LIMITS	 ON	 LOCAL	 GOVERNMENTS	 58‐59	 1995 ,	 http://digital.
library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1198	 https://perma.cc/S57X‐QKZ8 .	
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in	 revenue.128	State	 legislators	quickly	stepped	 in	with	emergency	grants	
to	 prevent	 the	 most	 severe	 municipal	 cuts.129	 When	 these	 proved	
inadequate,	however,	voters	passed	a	proposition	mandating	that	close	to	
40%	 of	 the	 state	 budget	 go	 to	 K–12	 schools	 each	 year—significantly	
diminishing	discretionary	 funds	 available	 for	 other	 areas,	 such	 as	 higher	
education	and	public	assistance.130	
TELs	 may	 also	 indirectly	 decrease	 revenue	 by	 dampening	 economic	
progress	 on	 a	 broader	 scale.	 Taking	 care	 to	 correct	 for	 statistical	
limitations	 in	 previous	 studies,131	 Steven	 Deller,	 Judith	 Stallman,	 and	
Lindsay	Amiel	have	explored	TELs’	 impact	using	a	growth	rate	model	 for	
all	 fifty	 states	 covering	 the	 period	 between	 1969	 and	 2005.132	 Their	
“results	provide	strong	evidence	that	the	imposition	of	 increasingly	more	
restrictive	TELs	on	either	 state	 and/or	 local	 governments	has	a	negative	
impact	on	economic	growth.”133	
Finally,	 recent	 research	 has	 suggested	 that	 TELs	 aggravate	 revenue	
volatility.	 As	 Mathew	 D.	 McCubbins	 and	 Ellen	 Moule	 have	 pointed	 out,	
localities	 suffered	 worse	 post‐recession	 revenue	 declines	 in	 recent	
decades	 after	 TELs	 forced	 them	 to	 substitute	 unstable	 income	 levies	 for	
lost	 property	 taxes.134	 Tucker	 Staley	 has	 similarly	 noted	 a	 correlation	
between	 more	 stringent	 TELs	 and	 state	 revenue	 instability,	 after	
controlling	for	a	range	of	economic	and	political	factors.135	 	
	
128.	 See	 ALBERT	 J.	 LIPSON	 &	 MARVIN	 LAVIN,	 POLITICAL	 AND	 LEGAL	 RESPONSES	 TO	
PROPOSITION	 13	 IN	 CALIFORNIA	 1	 RAND	 Corp.,	 R‐2483‐DOJ,	 1980 ,	
www.dtic.mil/cgi‐bin/GetTRDoc?AD ADA511800	
https://perma.cc/W27F‐2AJV .	
129.	 See	Nirupama	 Jayaraman,	 School	 Finance	 in	 California	 and	 the	Proposition	
98	Guarantee,	CAL.	BUDGET	&	POL’Y	CTR.	2	 2006 ,	http://calbudgetcenter.org/	
wp‐content/uploads/0604_prop98.pdf	 https://perma.cc/3B63‐298E .	







132.	 See	Steven	Deller,	 Judith	 I.	 Stallmann	&	Lindsay	Amiel,	The	 Impact	of	State	
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B.		 Disappearing	Sales	Tax	Revenue	
In	 addition	 to	 imposing	 revenue	 restrictions,	 states	 have	 failed	 to	
counteract	shrinking	sales	tax	bases.	Sales	tax	receipts	make	up	about	one‐




This	 shift	 appears	 to	 bear	 substantial	 responsibility	 for	 heightened	
revenue	 volatility.	 Sales	 taxes	 have	 proven	 a	 far	 more	 stable	 source	 of	
revenue	 than	 income	 taxes	 over	 time.138	 However,	 in	 the	 past	 three	
decades,	sales	tax	receipts	have	progressively	lost	ground	to	income	levies.	
While	general	sales	 tax	revenue	 inched	 from	31.5%	to	31.9%	of	 total	 tax	
receipts	between	1980	and	2010,	the	proportion	of	revenue	derived	from	
personal	income	taxes	rose	from	27.1%	to	33.6%.139	Had	states	prevented	
the	 erosion	 of	 their	 sales	 tax	 bases,	 they	would	 have	 limited	 income	 tax	
revenues’	relative	growth	and	the	instability	that	accompanied	it.	
Public	 finance	 scholar	 David	 Sjoquist	 has	 tied	 eroding	 sales	 tax	
revenue	 to	 three	 legal	 challenges.140	 First,	 states’	 sales	 taxes	 have	
continued	 to	 exclude	 nearly	 all	 service	 purchases.	 This	 omission	 has	
proven	increasingly	important	as	the	economy	has	transitioned	away	from	
heavy	 industry.	 According	 to	 the	 Bureau	 of	 Economic	 Analysis,	 services	
rose	 from	 52.6%	 to	 63.3%	 of	 total	 consumption	 expenditures	 between	
1980	 and	 2011.141	 State	 sales	 taxes	 have	 therefore	 been	 “applied	 to	 a	
smaller	share	of	consumer	purchases.”142	
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to	 placate	 businesses,	 particularly	 those	 in	 the	 agricultural	 and	 energy	
sectors.144	
Third,	 until	 recently,	 states	 mostly	 found	 themselves	 unable	 to	 take	
advantage	of	rising	online	sales.	The	Supreme	Court’s	1992	ruling	in	Quill	
Corporation	v.	North	Dakota	held	that	states	could	only	force	vendors	who	
have	 a	 physical	 presence	 within	 their	 borders	 to	 collect	 sales	 and	 use	
taxes.145	 As	 tax	 scholar	 Kirk	 Stark	 has	 emphasized,	 for	 decades,	 the	
“practical	 effect	 of	 this	 rule	 was 	 to	 carve	 out	 an	 area	 of	 tax‐free	
consumption	via	mail‐order	and	 internet	purchases.”146	Recent	estimates	











Quill	 in	 South	 Dakota	 v.	 Wayfair,	 Inc.151	 Writing	 for	 the	 Court,	 Justice	
Kennedy	 stressed	 that	 “ m odern	e‐commerce	does	not	 align	analytically	
with	a	test	that	relies	on	the	sort	of	physical	presence	defined	in	Quill.”152	
He	also	admonished	the	Quill	rule	as	an	“extraordinary	imposition	by	the	








149.	 See	 ERIKA	 K.	 LUNDER	 &	 CAROL	 A.	 PETTIT,	 CONG.	 RES.	 SERV.,	 R42629,	 “AMAZON	





151.	 138	S.	Ct.	2080	 2018 .	
152.	 Id.	at	2095.	
153.	 Id.	
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It	is	still	too	early	to	tell	exactly	how	states	will	react	to	Wayfair.	Many	
lawmakers	 eagerly	 awaited	 the	 ruling	 to	 tax	 online	 retailers	 whose	
transactions	in	their	states	exceed	a	certain	threshold.154	However,	Justice	
Kennedy	 was	 careful	 to	 reiterate	 that	 the	 Dormant	 Commerce	 Clause	
prevents	 states	 from	 discriminating	 against	 interstate	 commerce.155	
Exactly	what	such	non‐discrimination	requires	will	likely	form	the	basis	of	
future	 court	 challenges.	 In	 the	 meantime,	 both	 states’	 policy	
experimentation	 and	 companies’	 desire	 to	 shape	 how	 these	 taxes	 are	
structured	should	provide	fruitful	areas	for	real‐time	research.	
C.		 Eroding	Corporate	Tax	Revenue	
States’	 corporate	 tax	 revenues	have	also	 contracted	 in	 the	past	 three	
decades.	 Average	 corporate	 income	 tax	 revenue	 declined	 from	 9.7%	 to	
5.2%	 of	 states’	 total	 tax	 hauls	 between	 1980	 and	 2010.156	 Strikingly,	
corporate	 income	 tax	 revenue	 nearly	 halved	 as	 a	 proportion	 of	 the	
American	economy	in	this	period,	from	$6	to	just	$3	per	$1,000	of	personal	
income.157	Legal	structures	have	again	stood	at	the	heart	of	this	trend.	As	
Michael	 Leachman	 and	Nicholas	 Johnson	 have	 stressed,	 “ s tate	 tax	 laws	
do	not	reflect	the	reality	of	current	corporate	structures.”158	
Three	 sets	 of	 legal	 institutions	 stand	 out.	 First,	 corporations	 have	
taken	advantage	of	existing	classifications	 to	minimize	 their	 tax	burdens.	
Many	 smaller	 entities	 have	 chosen	 to	 operate	 as	 S‐Corporations	 and	
Limited	 Liability	 Companies	 rather	 than	 as	 C‐Corporations.159	 This	 has	
	
154.	 See	 Paul	 Graney,	 Opinion,	 States	Will	Move	Quickly	 to	 Capture	More	 Sales	
Tax	 in	 Wake	 of	 Wayfair	 Ruling,	 MARKETWATCH	 June	 22,	 2018,	 1:12	 PM ,	
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/states‐will‐move‐quickly‐to‐capture‐
more‐sales‐tax‐in‐wake‐of‐wayfair‐ruling‐2018‐06‐22	 https://perma.cc/	
6WKU‐GNZ6 ;	 David	 Casper,	 Laura	 Robichaud	 &	 Sonya	 Storm,	 States	
Respond	 to	 SCOTUS	 Wayfair	 Decision,	 EIDE	 BAILLY,	 LLP	 Sept.	 24,	 2018 ,	
https://www.eidebailly.com/insights/articles/2018/7/states‐respond‐to‐
scotus‐wayfair	 https://perma.cc/V2ZM‐VUQL .	




to	 reduce	 companies’	 compliance	 costs.	 Id.	 at	 2099‐100.	Whether	 these	 or	











and	 establish	 subsidiaries	 that	 shield	 their	 parent	 companies	 from	 state	
levies.160	 State	 governments	 have	 largely	 stood	 by	 as	 corporations	 have	
made	these	changes.161	
Second,	 states	 have	 multiplied	 the	 tax	 breaks	 they	 provide	
corporations	 in	 a	 push	 to	 create	 “business‐friendly”	 climates.162	 The	
Upjohn	 Institute	 has	 estimated	 that	 states	 roughly	 tripled	 their	 business	
incentives	from	1990	to	2015.163	Though	these	tax	breaks’	exact	quantity	
is	 hard	 to	 pin	 down,	 they	have	had	 clear	 effects:	 on	 average,	 states’	 real	
corporate	 tax	 rate	 has	 decreased	 by	 approximately	 one‐third	 since	 the	
1980s.164	
Finally,	 federal	 statutes	 have	 circumscribed	 states’	 taxing	 authority.	
Since	 1959,	 Public	 Law	 86‐272	 has	 limited	 the	 scope	 of	 state	 corporate	





income	 tax”	 has	 prevented	 states	 from	 adopting	 value‐added	 taxes	 that	






163.	 See	 Timothy	 J.	 Bartik,	 A	 New	 Panel	 Database	 on	 Business	 Incentives	 for	
Economic	 Development	 Offered	 by	 State	 and	 Local	 Governments	 in	 the	
United	 States,	 W.E.	 UPJOHN	 INST.	 FOR	 EMP.	 RES.	 3,	 65	 Feb.	 2017 ,	
http://www.upjohn.org/models/bied/maps/ReportFinal.pdf																									
https://perma.cc/ZYH7‐F535 .	
164.	 See	 William	 F.	 Fox	 &	 LeAnn	 Luna,	 State	 Corporate	 Tax	 Revenue	 Trends:	
Causes	and	Possible	Solutions,	55	NAT’L	TAX	J.	491,	495	 2002 .	
165.	 See	Stark,	supra	note	98,	at	427‐29.	
166.	 MULTISTATE	 TAX	 COMM’N,	 STATEMENT	 OF	 INFORMATION	 CONCERNING	 PRACTICES	 OF	
MULTISTATE	TAX	COMMISSION	AND	SIGNATORY	STATES	UNDER	PUBLIC	LAW	86‐272,	at	
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D.		 Multiplying	Tax	Expenditures	
Last	 but	 not	 least,	 states	 have	 increasingly	 used	 tax	 expenditures	 to	




tax	 receipts.	 These	 laws’	 especially	 low	 visibility	 has	 concealed	 this	
revenue	drain.	
While	 tax	 preferences	 have	 long	 existed,	 the	modern	 concept	 of	 tax	
expenditures	 only	 gained	 steam	 after	 Stanley	 Surrey	 and	 Lawrence	
Woodworth	 published	 a	 review	 of	 the	 federal	 tax	 code	 in	 1969.168	 As	
Christopher	 Howard’s	 seminal	 studies	 have	 shown,	 federal	 tax	
expenditures	 became	 a	 primary	 fiscal	 tool	 from	 that	 point	 onward,	
generating	 a	 “hidden	welfare	 state”	 that	 escaped	public	 scrutiny	 and	 the	
political	 pressures	 that	 usually	 influence	 social	 policy.169	 Congress’s	
embrace	 of	 these	 laws	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	 1980s	 put	 a	 robust	 tax	
expenditure	 ecosystem	 in	 place.	 In	 fiscal	 year	 2015,	 169	 different	
expenditures	 in	 the	 federal	 tax	 code	 caused	 the	 federal	 government	 to	
forego	 $1.2	 trillion	 in	 tax	 revenue—the	 equivalent	 of	 about	 one‐third	 of	
the	federal	budget.170	
States	 have	 eagerly	 followed	 the	 U.S.	 government’s	 lead.	 States	 now	
spend	tens	of	billions	of	dollars	on	tax	expenditures	each	year.171	In	many	
states,	 these	 provisions	 account	 for	 nearly	 half	 of	 all	 public	 outlays.172	
Unfortunately,	 like	 at	 the	national	 level,	 the	breadth	 and	depth	of	 states’	
tax	 expenditures	 remain	 poorly	 understood.	 As	 public	 policy	 analysts	
Jason	Levitis,	Nicholas	 Johnson,	 and	 Jeremy	Koulish	have	 stressed,	 “ t ax	
expenditures	usually	receive	far	less	scrutiny	 than	does	direct	spending .	
For	 the	 most	 part,	 policymakers	 do	 not	 regularly	 examine	 tax	
	
168.	 See	Julian	E.	Zelizer,	The	Hidden	Welfare	State:	Tax	Expenditures	and	Social	
Policy	in	the	United	States,	74	BUS.	HIST.	REV.	166,	166	 2000 	 book	review .	
169.	 See	 e.g.,	 CHRISTOPHER	HOWARD,	 THE	HIDDEN	WELFARE	 STATE:	 TAX	 EXPENDITURES	
AND	SOCIAL	POLICY	IN	THE	UNITED	STATES	 1997 .	
170.	 See	U.S.	GOV’T	ACCOUNTABILITY	OFF.,	GAO‐16‐622,	TAX	EXPENDITURES	1	 2016 ,	
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/678262.pdf	 https://perma.cc/QU88‐2L	
LC .	
171.	 See	 Jason	 Levitis,	 Nicholas	 Johnson	 &	 Jeremy	 Koulish,	 Promoting	 State	
Budget	Accountability	Through	Tax	Expenditure	Reporting,	CTR.	ON	BUDGET	&	
POL’Y	 PRIORITIES	 1	 Apr.	 2009 ,	 https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/	
atoms/files/4‐9‐09sfp.pdf	 https://perma.cc/PNS2‐PVHN .	
172.	 Id.	
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expenditures,	 nor	 do	 states	 document	 their	 effectiveness	 the	 same	 way	
they	do	for	on‐budget	expenditures.”173	
Evidence	 from	 individual	 states	 confirms	 that	 tax	 expenditures	 have	
altered	 revenue	 flows	 in	 dramatic,	 yet	 under‐appreciated	ways.	 Virginia	
provides	a	useful	example.	Between	1990	and	2009,	 the	 state	 created	or	
amended	more	 than	 sixty	 different	 tax	 expenditure	 programs.174	 By	 the	
end	of	this	period,	these	laws	were	costing	the	state	$2.5	billion	a	year.175	
About	 half	 of	 this	 amount	 stemmed	 from	 the	 repeal	 of	 an	 unpopular	
vehicle	levy	rather	than	from	targeted	social	policy.176	This	“car	tax”	repeal	
represented	 little	 more	 than	 a	 giveaway	 by	 a	 governor	 who	 wished	 to	




vague	 sense	 of	 how	 expensive	 they	 really	 are.	 As	 the	 Commonwealth	
Institute	has	pointed	out,	“ l ittle	evaluation	of	tax	expenditures	occurs	in	
Virginia.	 The	 state	 does	 not	 regularly	 report	 on	 tax	 expenditures	 in	 any	
comprehensive	 way	 or	 subject	 proposed	 new	 expenditures	 to	 standard	
criteria	that	might	determine	whether	adopting	one	is	good	policy.”179	Tax	
expenditures’	obscure	nature	makes	 it	 especially	 important	 that	 scholars	
study	these	laws	in	the	coming	years.	
E.		 A	New	Baseline	from	Which	to	Study	States’	Tax	Histories	










177.	 DAVID	BRUNORI,	STATE	TAX	POLICY:	A	PRIMER	43‐44	 4th	ed.	2016 .	
178.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Ryan	Butler,	 Virginia	 Legislators	 Face	 $1	 Billion	 Budget	 Shortfall,	
LOUDON	 TRIB.	 Jan.	 11,	 2017 ,	 https://www.loudountribune.com/virginia‐
legislators‐face‐1‐billion‐budget‐shortfall/	 https://perma.cc/D4Q2‐3XR7 ;	
Nick	 Iannelli,	 Va.	 Gov.	 McAuliffe	 to	 Announce	 Actions	 on	 Budget	 Shortfall,	
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shrinking	sales	and	corporate	tax	bases,	and	multiplying	tax	expenditures	
have	both	 constrained	 state	 tax	 revenues	and	heightened	 their	 volatility.	
Though	there	is	little	doubt	that	this	list	is	non‐exhaustive—and	that	legal	
scholars	 will	 need	 to	 identify	 further	 causes	 of	 revenue	 stagnation—it	
provides	 a	 starting	 point	 from	 which	 to	 dissect	 the	 history	 of	 states’	
budgets.	
The	analytical	categories	outlined	above	remain	fluid	and	intertwined.	
Tax	 expenditures,	 for	 instance,	 have	 played	 a	 large	 role	 in	 diminishing	
corporate	 tax	 receipts.	 By	 curbing	 lawmakers’	 ability	 to	 align	 tax	 codes	
with	 socioeconomic	 advances,	 TELs	 have	 likely	 also	 contributed	 to	
disappearing	levies	on	consumer	transactions.	
Nonetheless,	these	groupings	provide	a	useful	heuristic	through	which	
to	 begin	 examining	 states’	 shifting	 political	 economies.	 By	 probing	 these	
areas	 in	 comparative	 and	 historical	 perspective,	 legal	 scholars	 can	
rigorously	 test	 how	 institutions	 have	 changed	 over	 time,	 how	 they	 have	
combined	to	alter	particular	states’	fiscal	fortunes,	and	whether	some	laws	
have	 held	more	 sway	 than	 others	 across	 the	 nation.	 Furthermore,	 these	
categories	offer	a	baseline	from	which	to	answer	the	second	question	vital	









An	 emerging	 group	 of	 theorists	 has	 offered	 a	 framework	 geared	
toward	 these	problems.	As	political	 parties	have	become	more	polarized	
and	unresponsive	to	majorities’	needs,	researchers	have	moved	away	from	
models	 premised	 on	 median	 voters’	 preferences.180	 They	 have	 instead	
sought	to	make	sense	of	change	by	placing	contested	policies	at	the	center	
of	 their	 analysis—policies	 like	 the	 tax	 institutions	 outlined	 in	 the	 prior	
section.181	
By	 honing	 in	 on	 specific	 tax	 arrangements	 that	 have	 produced	




181.	 See	 Jacob	 S.	 Hacker	 &	 Paul	 Pierson,	 After	 the	 “Master	 Theory”:	 Downs,	
Schattschneider,	 and	 the	 Rebirth	 of	 Policy‐Focused	 Analysis,	 12	 PERSP.	 ON	
POL.	643	 2014 .	
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who	 shaped	 their	 configuration	 and	 the	 reasons	 for	 which	 they	 did	 so.	
Existing	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 anti‐tax	 interest	 groups	 both	 pushed	 for	





defines	 politics	 because	 it	 forms	 the	 prize	 over	which	 different	 interests	
compete.182	Policy	can	confer	substantial	advantages	on	particular	groups	
and	 individuals.	 It	 can	also	 threaten	others’	 very	 existence.	As	 such,	 “the	
institutional	 terrain	 established	 by	 significant	 public	 policies	 has	 a	
powerful	 impact	 on	 structures	 of	 political	 organization.”183	 Focusing	 on	
the	laws	that	undergird	a	policy—and	the	outcomes	these	laws	mold—can	
expose	“who	organizes,	how	they	organize,”	and	why	they	organize.184	
Fiscal	 policy	 is	 a	 highly	 desirable	 prize.	 As	 noted	 above,	 tax	
preferences	provide	billions	of	dollars	each	year	to	the	people	they	benefit.	
Groups	 that	 secure	 lower	 tax	 rates	 in	 areas	 that	 concern	 them	 stand	 to	




According	 to	 this	 “policy‐focused”	 strand	of	political	 science,	 interest	
groups	 are	 the	 actors	 best	 positioned	 to	 guide	 political	 change.185	
Navigating	 legislative	 and	 bureaucratic	 rulemaking	 demands	 broad	
sophistication.	As	Hacker	and	Pierson	have	shown,	sustaining	activity	over	
the	long	periods	needed	to	attain	policy	victories	“requires	the	capacity	to	
overcome	 collective	 action	 problems,	 mobilize	 resources,	 coordinate	
actions	with	 others,	 develop	 extensive	 expertise,	.	.	.	 and	 operate	 flexibly	
across	 multiple	 domains	 of	 political	 authority.”186	 These	 are	 not	 often	
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Existing	research	suggests	that	interest	groups	have	played	a	key	role	
in	 reconfiguring	 state	 revenue	 institutions.	As	 Isaac	Martin	has	 revealed,	
the	movement	 that	 swept	TELs	 into	 law	across	 the	country	 in	 the	1970s	
benefited	 from	decades	of	well‐funded	opposition	 to	 taxes.188	Martin	has	
traced	 the	efficiency	with	which	 states	 adopted	 revenue	 restrictions	 to	 a	
network	 of	 groups	 created	 to	 rally	 for	 a	 repeal	 of	 the	 Sixteenth	
Amendment,	which	gave	Congress	broad	powers	to	levy	an	income	tax.189	
The	first	of	these	groups	formed	in	response	to	the	Revenue	Act	of	1935,	
which	 increased	 income	 taxes	 on	 the	 wealthy	 to	 help	 pay	 for	 the	 New	
Deal.190	 By	 the	 1960s,	 organizations	 such	 as	 the	National	 Committee	 for	
Economic	 Freedom	 NCEF 	 and	 the	 National	 Taxpayers	 Union	 NTU 	
operated	 full‐fledged	 campaigns	 to	 limit	 governments’	 tax	 authority.191	
While	 the	1970s	 tax	 revolt	was	 rooted	 in	 local	 fears	 that	 rising	property	
taxes	would	 force	 people	 out	 of	 their	 homes,192	 this	 pre‐existing	web	 of	




shown	 that	 right‐wing	 policy	 entrepreneurs	 rely	 on	 three	 resource‐rich	
groups	to	pass	new	laws.194	First,	a	cluster	of	think	tanks	associated	with	
the	State	Policy	Network	 SPN 	generates	studies	and	opinion	pieces	that	

























tax	 and	 fiscal	 policy	 reforms	.	.	.	 and	 many	 states	 successfully	 acting	 on	
those	 proposals.”198	 Scholars	 need	 to	 more	 closely	 explore	 how	 these	




Focusing	 solely	 on	 active	 policymaking	 would	 be	 a	 mistake.	
Determined	 actors	 can	 have	 just	 as	 powerful	 an	 impact	 by	 inhibiting	
reform.	Hacker	has	labeled	this	strategy	“policy	drift,”	or	“the	fine	political	
art	of	producing	change	by	doing	nothing.”199	As	he	has	underlined,	 “ i n	
an	environment	of	new	or	worsening	social	risks,	opponents	of	expanded	
state	 responsibility	 do	 not	 have	 to	 enact	 major	 laws 	 to	 move	 policy	





the	 country’s	 largest	 corporations,	 ATR	 has	 spent	 twenty‐five	 years	
convincing	 state	 and	 federal	 legislators	 to	 sign	 a	 pledge	 never	 to	 raise	
taxes	 while	 in	 office.201	 The	 campaign	 has	 proven	 a	 triumph:	 by	 2011,	
thirteen	governors,	forty	of	the	forty‐seven	Republicans	in	the	U.S.	Senate,	
236	of	the	242	Republicans	in	the	U.S.	House	of	Representatives,	and	close	
to	1,300	 state	 lawmakers	had	 signed	 the	pledge.202	As	political	 scientists	
Michael	 Tomz	 and	 Robert	 Van	 Houweling	 have	 shown	 using	 survey	
experiments,	 Norquist’s	 pledge	 has	 proven	 remarkably	 “effective	 at	
	
198.	 Arthur	 B.	 Laffer,	 Stephen	 Moore	 &	 Jonathan	 Williams,	 Rich	 States,	 Poor	
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Hidden	 Politics	 of	 Social	 Policy	 Retrenchment	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 98	 AM.	
POL.	SCI.	REV.	243,	246	 2004 .	
201.	 See	 Tim	Dickinson,	 Grover	Norquist:	 The	 Billionaires’	 Best	 Friend,	 ROLLING	








Evidence	 suggests	 that	 drift	 has	 profoundly	 shaped	 states’	 revenue	
structures.	 For	 example,	 state	 legislators	have	become	more	 reluctant	 to	
raise	 taxes	 to	 cope	with	 economic	 downturns.	 As	 recently	 as	 the	 1990s,	
lawmakers	 remained	 unafraid	 to	 increase	 taxes	 to	 combat	 recessionary	
revenue	declines.204	However,	in	the	last	decade,	they	have	sharply	turned	
away	 from	 tax	 increases.	 This	 shift	 has	 both	 depressed	 revenue	 and	
lengthened	the	time	needed	for	budgets	to	stabilize	and	recover.205	
This	 trend	 first	 took	 hold	 during	 the	 2001	 recession.	 According	 to	




have	 raised	 approximately	 $33	billion	more	 in	2003	 if	 they	had	 adopted	
the	same	tax‐rate	increases	between	2002	and	2003	as	they	did	between	
1991	and	1992.207	
Reactions	 to	 the	 Great	 Recession	 were	 no	 different.	 Only	 a	 small	
handful	 of	 states	 significantly	 raised	 taxes	 to	 cope	 with	 budget	
shortfalls.208	California,	New	York,	and	Illinois	alone	accounted	for	81%	of	
all	new	revenue	raised	between	2010	and	2014.209	This	unwillingness	 to	
raise	 taxes	 had	 a	 clear	 effect	 on	 states’	 fiscal	 health.	 Over	 this	 five‐year	
	
203.	 Michael	 Tomz	 &	 Robert	 P.	 Van	 Houweling,	 Political	 Pledges	 as	 Credible	
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Occurs	 5,	 9	 Urban	 Inst.,	 Discussion	 Paper	 No.	 99‐04,	 1999 ,	 http://www.
urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication‐pdfs/409068‐State‐
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205.	 See	 Donald	 J.	 Boyd	 &	 Lucy	 Dadayan,	 The	 Economy	 Recovers	 While	 State	
Finances	 Lag,	 NELSON	 A.	 ROCKEFELLER	 INST.	 GOV’T	 20	 June	 2015 ,	
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period,	states	collected	only	an	$33	billion	in	additional	tax	receipts.	This	
figure	 is	 38%	 lower	 than	 the	 total	 additional	 amount—$54	billion—that	
they	levied	after	the	1990	recession.210	
It	is	likely	that	many	of	the	challenges	that	states	face	can	be	traced	to	
lawmakers’	 failure	 to	 align	 tax	 codes	 with	 new	 economic	 conditions.	
Prominent	examples	include	states’	decisions	not	to	apply	the	sales	tax	to	
services	 or	 to	 counter	 firms’	 efforts	 to	 reclassify	 their	 activities	 to	 avoid	
taxes.	The	causes	of	such	choices	deserve	closer	scholarly	scrutiny	 in	 the	





future	 research:	 the	 legal	 and	 political	 origins	 of	 states’	 long‐run	 fiscal	
challenges.	 For	 decades,	 public	 services	 have	 deteriorated	 in	 the	 face	 of	
tightening	 state	 budgets.	 Stagnant	 and	 more	 volatile	 tax	 revenues	 have	
significantly	 contributed	 to	 these	 funding	 constraints.	 However,	 despite	
tax	 laws’	 effect	 on	 revenue	 patterns,	 legal	 scholars	 have	 not	 thoroughly	
explored	 the	 roots	 of	 states’	 fiscal	 struggles.	 Looking	 forward,	 scholars	
ought	 to	 examine	which	 tax	 institutions	 fostered	 inadequate	 levies	 over	
time	and	why	revenue	systems	evolved	to	promote	this	outcome.	
Current	 findings	 in	 economics	 and	 political	 science	 suggest	 paths	
forward	on	both	fronts.	With	respect	to	which	tax	institutions	are	to	blame	
for	slow	and	unsteady	revenue	growth,	 researchers	have	pointed	 to	new	
tax	 limitations,	withering	 sales	 tax	 regimes,	 eroding	 corporate	 tax	 bases,	
and	 multiplying	 tax	 expenditures.	 With	 respect	 to	 why	 tax	 institutions	
have	been	allowed	to	underperform,	political	scientists	have	stressed	the	
rise	of	organized	interests	that	have	lobbied	to	lower	state	taxes.	Fleshing	
out	 these	 hypotheses	 across	 particular	 states,	 time	 periods,	 and	 budget	
areas	 will	 require	 analyses	 that	 place	 states’	 political	 economies	 in	
comparative	 and	 historical	 perspective.	 Such	 work	 can	 now	 hopefully	
begin	on	stronger	footing.	
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